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ABSTRACT 
One of the contentious philosophical issues surrounding the cognitive science of religion 
(CSR) is whether well-confirmed CSR theories would debunk religious beliefs. These de-
bates have been contentious in part because of criticisms of epistemic principles used in 
debunking arguments. In this paper I use Ernest Sosa’s respected theory of knowledge as 
fully apt belief—which avoids objections that have been leveled against sensitivity and safe-
ty principles often used in debunking arguments—to construct a plausible debunking argu-
ment for religious belief on the assumption that religious belief is formed simply through 
processes theorized by CSR. But, in fact, most believers also rely on arguments of various 
sorts, and their beliefs are not debunked.
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RESUMO
Uma das questões filosóficas controversas que cercam a ciência cognitiva da religião (CCR) 
é se as teorias de CCR desmitificariam crenças religiosas. Esses debates têm sido contro-
versos, em parte, por causa das críticas aos princípios epistêmicos usados para desmisti-
ficar argumentos. Neste artigo, uso a respeitada teoria do conhecimento de Ernest Sosa 
como crença plenamente apta – que evita objeções que foram levantadas contra princípios 
de sensibilidade e segurança frequentemente usados em desmistificar argumentos – para 
construir um argumento de desmistificação plausível para a crença religiosa na suposição 
de que crença religiosa é formada simplesmente por meio de processos teorizados pelo 
CCR. Mas, de fato, a maioria dos crentes também conta com argumentos de vários tipos, e 
suas crenças não são desmistificadas.
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Joshua C. Thurow1
One of the interesting philosophical issues raised by the cognitive science of religion 
(CSR) is whether well-confirmed CSR theories would debunk religious beliefs. What exactly 
it means to debunk a belief will be discussed shortly, but as a first pass: to debunk a belief is 
to give good reason to think that the belief is poorly formed/unreliable/incompetent. There 
has been some controversy about whether well-confirmed CSR theories would debunk reli-
gious beliefs; some scholars say ‘yes’ (Bering, 2011; Bloom, 2009; Bulbulia, 2013; Leben, 2014; 
Wilkins and Griffiths, 2012), others say ‘no’ (Barrett, 2007; Leech and Visala, 2011; Murray, 
2009; Murray and Schloss, 2013; Thurow, 2013; 2014; van Inwagen, 2009). This whole debate 
is mirrored by a debate in metaethics over whether evolutionary explanations of moral beliefs 
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debunk such beliefs—with just as much controversy (see 
e.g. Joyce, 2006; Shafer-Landau, 2012; Street, 2006; Vavova, 
2014, 2015; Wielenberg, 2016).
Much of the controversy rests ultimately on how to 
understand debunking arguments and on whether there is a 
plausible epistemic principle undergirding such arguments. In 
this paper I want to explore whether a compelling debunk-
ing argument can be built using Ernest Sosa’s epistemological 
framework, which prizes fully apt belief as a particularly valu-
able human form of knowledge. Sosa’s framework may help 
to advance discussion on our central question because (i) his 
framework has gained widespread acceptance, unlike some of 
the principles used in previous versions of debunking argu-
ments, and (ii) Sosa’s central notion of apt belief has various 
advantages over the notions of sensitivity and safety, which 
have featured prominently in the epistemological principles 
used in previous debunking arguments.
I shall begin by presenting a general schema for de-
bunking arguments and then discussing the challenges that 
face some of the prominent epistemological principles that 
have been plugged into this schema. In the second section I 
briefly present Sosa’s epistemological framework and in the 
third section I use that framework to construct and evaluate 
a few debunking arguments using epistemological principles 
derived from Sosa’s framework. I argue that a plausible epis-
temological principle can be drawn from Sosa’s framework 
that can be used to construct a plausible debunking argument 
for religious belief on the assumption that religious belief is 
formed simply through processes theorized by CSR. But, in 
fact, most believers also rely on arguments of various sorts, 
and their beliefs are not debunked.
Debunking arguments
To debunk a belief is to challenge that belief in a certain 
sort of way. Familiar claims of bias are examples of debunk-
ing arguments. Joe says to Jane, “you just believe the cops are 
innocent of murder because you are fearful of black people.” 
Joe thus challenges Jane’s belief that the cops are innocent. 
Notice that the challenge doesn’t attempt to provide evidence 
against Jane’s belief—Joe does not in this statement attempt 
to show that her belief is false or doubtful in itself. Rather, 
he challenges her belief by charging that it was formed im-
properly—using some method or under some influence or in 
some circumstances that are risky. In this case, he charges that 
her belief is formed under the influence of fear rather than 
through any competence at assessing the guilt or innocence of 
the cops. Fear is assumed to be an improper or risky ground 
for this belief. Why? Different versions of the debunking ar-
gument, assuming different epistemic principles, will answer 
this question differently. Some will say that fear doesn’t track 
the truth, others that it is an unreliable guide, or that it is an 
insensitive or unsafe ground for belief. 
Many debunking arguments fit the following schema:
(1)  My class of beliefs C are influenced by factor F.
(2)  When C beliefs are influenced the way they are by F, 
they do not satisfy epistemic condition R.
(3)  Once I become justified in believing that a set of be-
liefs do not satisfy epistemic condition R, then I lack 
epistemic status E in continuing to hold those beliefs. 
[=Epistemic Debunking Principle]
------
C. I lack epistemic status E in continuing to hold the 
beliefs in C.
Premise (3), the Epistemic Debunking Principle, is the 
lone philosophical premise in this argument. Different sub-
stitutions for R and E will yield different epistemic debunk-
ing principles. Possible instances of R include being reliable, 
sensitive, or safe. Typically, the instances of E will be either 
knowledge or justification.
To illustrate one way to fill in the debunking argument 
schema, return to the example of Joe and Jane. Joe claims that 
Jane’s belief that the cops are innocent is influenced by fear of 
black people. A common way to fill out the debunking argu-
ment is as follows: believing that one person is innocent on 
the basis of fear of others is an improper way of forming a 
belief because if the cop were guilty, Jane would still believe 
he was innocent because her fear of black people would still 
be present. In other words, beliefs of this sort formed in fear 
are not sensitive to the truth. And once we realize a belief is 
formed insensitively, we are thereby unjustified in continuing 
to hold that belief. This debunking argument rests on the fol-
lowing epistemic debunking principle:
Sensitivity EDP: once I become justified in believing that a set 
of beliefs are insensitive to the truth given the way that they 
are formed, then I lack justification in continuing to hold 
those beliefs.
This principle is but one of many possible principles one 
might use as an epistemic debunking principle. However, sen-
sitivity debunking principles like this one are frequently ap-
pealed to—implicitly or explicitly—in debunking argument 
literature (e.g. Bedke, 2014; Thurow, 2013; White, 2010; 
Wilkins and Griffiths, 2012). In the remainder of this section 
I will briefly describe the problems that face this and one oth-
er popular principle. We will then be left with a question: is 
there a more plausible epistemic principle we can use in de-
bunking arguments, and can a plausible CSR-based debunk-
ing argument be built on it? Our subsequent investigation of 
Sosa’s epistemology will begin to answer these questions.
Many have found the sensitivity principle plausible 
because it captures an intuitive idea: that we want our be-
lief-forming methods to track the truth in such a way that we 
are not led astray when we use them. Sensitivity is one way 
of having a tight connection between beliefs formed by our 
methods and the truth. A sensitive method M won’t lead us 
astray because if it is sensitive, then the following is true: if p 
were false, then I wouldn’t believe p using method M.
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Despite the intuitive attra iveness of this principle, 
it has faced many objections—most derived from classic 
objections to the truth-tracking theory of knowledge de-
veloped by Robert Nozick (1981), which employed a sen-
sitivity requirement. (A) Every inductively-inferred belief is 
insensitive, even when the inductive inference is very strong. 
To take an example inspired by Jonathan Vogel (1987): 
Knowing I am inebriated and a poor shot, I decide to at-
tempt to hit the bullseye with a dart by throwing the dart 
backwards over my shoulder while looking away from the 
dartboard. I am very unlikely to succeed. I am justified in 
believing that I will miss. But my belief is insensitive because 
if my belief were false—i.e. if I were to hit the bullseye—I 
would still believe that I was going to miss. But even know-
ing my belief is thus insensitive, I seem justified in maintain-
ing my belief that I will miss. (B) The principle will imply 
that justification is not closed under recognized entailment. 
(C) It implies that I can never be justified in believing that 
my belief that p arrived at using M is not incorrect, because 
if that belief were false—i.e. if my belief that p arrived at 
using M were incorrect—I would still believe otherwise (be-
cause, trivially, I would still believe that p and so still believe 
that that belief is not incorrect). This appears absurd.
Just as sensitivity principles in the theory of knowl-
edge were superseded by safety principles, some have re-
sponded to these worries by employing safety epistemic 
debunking principles. Tomas Bogardus (2016) considers a 
debunking argument that implicitly employs the following 
principle:
SafetyK EDP: if a set of beliefs are unsafe given the way they are 
formed, then these beliefs do not count as knowledge, where 
a belief is safe given it is formed using method M just when if 
I were to believe p using M, then p would be true.
He then goes on to critique this principle by point-
ing out that knowledge need not be safe: imagine Jones has 
the world’s most accurate atomic clock in his office which 
is accurate due to a sophisticated radiation sensor. That 
sensor, however, can be made to malfunction if a nearby 
radioactive isotope were to decay. Earlier this morning, 
someone left a sample of radioactive isotope near the clock 
in Jones’s office. Unlikely enough, the isotope has not de-
cayed. Jones is unaware of the isotope’s presence. He walks 
into his office, checks his clock, which is functioning prop-
erly and accurately reads “8:22” and he thus believes it is 
8:22. Bogardus contends that Jones clearly knows it is 8:22 
despite his belief being unsafe, for in many nearby worlds 
he would have believed the time the clock read, but the 
clock would have been incorrect because it would have 
been made to malfunction by the isotope.2
Of course, there are other safety-related epistemic prin-
ciples one might consider using, for instance:
SafetyK2 EDP: once I become justified in believing that a set of 
beliefs are unsafe given the way they are formed, then these 
beliefs no longer count as knowledge for me,
SafetyJ EDP: once I become justified in believing that a set of 
beliefs are unsafe given the way they are formed, then I lack 
justification in continuing to hold these beliefs. 
I won’t discuss these now, but some of what I have to say 
later about Sosa’s epistemological framework will be useful for 
evaluating these principles as well. 
So, there is some controversy about which epistemic 
principle(s) can plausibly be used in debunking arguments. 
Can Sosa’s sophisticated epistemological framework supply 
such a principle? Before answering this question, we first need 
to lay out his framework.
Sosa and fully apt belief
According to Sosa’s virtue epistemological theory of 
knowledge, knowledge is a certain sort of quality perfor-
mance of belief (or affirmation, as he puts it). Performances 
in general can be evaluated for their accuracy (i.e. whether 
they achieve their aim), their adroitness (whether they were 
performed competently), and for their aptness (whether they 
were accurate because adroit). Beliefs are accurate when they 
are true, they are adroit when they are formed competently, 
and they are apt when they are accurate because they were 
formed competently—or, as he sometimes puts it, the accura-
cy of the belief manifests competence. Knowledge is apt belief.
Aptness differs from safety. A belief can be apt though 
unsafe—as illustrated by the following example from Sosa 
(2017, p. 215-217). I can competently form a belief that my 
car will start a moment after I turn the key and that compe-
tence will then lead me to be correct, since my car actually 
does start. My belief is thus apt and constitutes knowledge. 
All of this can remain true even if there is a mad bomber who 
will detonate an atomic bomb right when I turn my key if 
the coin he flips turns up heads (in fact, lucky me, it comes 
up tails). In these circumstances my belief arrived at using 
my competent method is not safe because in half the nearby 
worlds my belief turns out to be false (the half in which he 
detonates the bomb, destroying me and my car and so my car, 
contrary to my belief, does not start).
The notion of a competence is central to Sosa’s system. 
For him a competence is “a disposition to succeed when one 
aims at a given objective, in certain (favorable enough) con-
ditions while in (good enough) shape” (Sosa, 2017, p. 193). 
A competence has a SSS structure—that is, a person’s com-
petence is composed of a skill, the shape one is in, and one’s 
situation. One’s skill is whatever it is inside one that grounds 
one’s disposition to succeed in a certain range of conditions 
and situations. ‘Shape’ refers to other personal chara eristics 
2 Sosa (2007, p. 28-29; 2017, p. 215-217) has similar counterexamples to a safety requirement on knowledge.
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relevant to performance—being alert, sober, with one’s eyes 
open, and the like. ‘Situation’ refers to a ects of the environ-
ment that must be present for competent performance—for 
instance, if the competence is playing basketball, the situation 
might include things like playing with a properly inflated ball, 
on an indoor surface that is dry, with rims that aren’t crooked. 
To be competent in a performance you must use your skill in 
an appropriate shape and situation.
So, for Sosa, a belief is formed competently when it is 
formed using a belief-forming skill, while in an appropri-
ate shape and situation. Perception is one example of a be-
lief-forming skill. The skill is the inner ability to form beliefs 
based on certain perceptual inputs. That skill operates prop-
erly when in a certain range of shape and situation—e.g. while 
being sober and alert, in normal lighting and in normal atmo-
spheric conditions (if one couldn’t breathe properly one’s skill 
wouldn’t operate properly and one’s beliefs wouldn’t likely be 
true). One has perceptual competence in forming a belief pro-
vided that one’s perceptual skill, when operating within the 
appropriate range of shape and situation, produces beliefs that 
are reliable (that is, safe for the most part). So, a belief can 
issue from a skill even if the skill that produces the belief is 
unreliable—because, for instance, in fact one only uses that 
skill in inappropriate shapes or situations. And, again, a belief 
can issue from a competence and yet be unsafe (unreliable)3 
because, even though it does issue from a skill in an appropri-
ate shape and situation, it could have very easily been the case 
that your shape or situation was inappropriate, resulting in a 
false belief. A competence (with a certain SSS structure) has 
to be reliable (safe) only in this sense: beliefs produced with 
this particular skill would mostly be true in appropriate shape 
and situation pairs.
Sosa accepts that there are levels of knowledge. Apt be-
lief is what he calls animal knowledge, but humans often find 
good reason to reflect on whether their beliefs are apt. An apt 
recognition that a belief is apt is what he calls reflective knowl-
edge. More recently, Sosa has made reflective knowledge sub-
sidiary to a more important kind of knowledge—what he 
calls knowing full well. One knows p full well when reflective 
knowledge guides animal knowledge—in other words when 
an apt recognition of the aptness of belief-formation methods 
leads one to employ an apt method in coming to believe p (see 
Sosa 2017, p. 95-101; 2011, p. 1-14).
Knowing full well is important, according to Sosa. 
He points out that it is an instance of a valuable sort of 
performance—one that is not only well done but also 
well-chosen. In addition, (A) the distinction helps explain 
why Gettier cases like the 10 coins case are clear cases of a 
lack of knowledge (because the agent in the case lacks both 
animal knowledge and knowledge full well), whereas barn 
façade cases are more controversial (because the agent in 
the case has animal knowledge but lacks knowledge full 
well). (B) Humans judge propositions and judgment is a 
state in which they consider which first-order attitude to 
take (belief or disbelief ). Judgement thus essentially in-
volves considering whether a belief that p is apt and aims 
to come to an apt belief about whether the belief would 
be apt. (C) Humans regularly have reason to take a per-
 ective on their beliefs and how they are formed, and their 
knowledge should reflect the reasons provided from this 
per ective. Knowing full well is the knowledge that can re-
sult from taking this per ective. (D) The belief we come to 
at the reflective level should take precedence over the belief 
we come to at the animal level. If, at the reflective level, I 
competently judge that I should su end judgment about 
whether a belief about p would be apt (or if I competently 
judge that forming a belief about p would be inapt), then I 
should su end judgment about p. As Sosa states, “it would 
seem deplorably stubborn to sustain and endorse a belief in 
the teeth of total available evidence strongly against it. And 
this is so even if that belief is correct through diachronic 
first-order competence that is supremely reliable… once 
a belief is under scrutiny, only such reflective knowledge 
qualifies as a proper basis for conscious reasoning, pra ical 
or theoretical” (Sosa, 2017, p. 164-165).
Lastly, we come to Sosa’s view on justification. He treats 
justification as necessary for knowledge. He does this by iden-
tifying justified belief with a skillful attempt to get things 
right. If you employ a cognitive skill in attempting to get the 
truth and come to a certain belief, then that belief is justi-
fied even if you fail to get the truth, and even if you weren’t 
competent because you didn’t use your skill in a proper shape 
or situation. With this notion of justification he can explain 
why people who are being deceived by an evil demon have 
justified beliefs: they are genuinely using cognitive skills (per-
ceptual faculties) to come to beliefs. They just happen to be in 
a situation that is not appropriate for those skills, and so their 
beliefs are not competent.
CSR debunking in Sosa’s 
epistemology
Debunking arguments criticize the way a belief was 
formed, so they dwell at the reflective level. Sosa’s epistemol-
ogy thus already provides a place for such arguments and 
acknowledges their potential significance for our first-order 
beliefs. If, at the reflective level, we can acquire good reason to 
believe that our belief-forming method for a first-order belief 
that p is in some way ill-formed, then we shouldn’t continue 
to believe that p. 
We’ll proceed by extra ing a series of epistemic de-
bunking principles from Sosa and then discussing whether a 
successful CSR-based debunking argument for religious belief 
3 Sosa often uses ‘safe’ to mean not strict safety, but instead the following: a belief is formed in a safe way just in case beliefs formed in 
that way would mostly be true. Safety in this sense is a sort of reliability that allows for a little more leeway than strict safety.
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can be constructed using these principles. The centrality of 
competence to Sosa’s system implies the following principle:
Comp1 EDP: if I come to know that my belief that p wasn’t 
formed competently, then I lack animal knowledge, reflective 
knowledge, knowledge full well, and justified belief that p.
On Sosa’s view knowledge, which is apt belief, requires 
competence. So, if I know my belief wasn’t competent, I 
know I don’t have animal knowledge of it. Thus, I also can’t 
have reflective knowledge or knowledge full well of it. I also 
won’t have a justified belief because if I know my belief was 
formed incompetently, then I know that I did not form it in 
a way (using a skill given my shape and situation) that was 
likely to guide me to the truth. And if I know that, then I 
won’t be justified in continuing to hold on to the belief, for 
given what I know the likelihood of getting the truth would 
appear to be too low.
Sometimes it might be hard to know, although one 
has good justification for believing, that a belief wasn’t 
formed competently. Comp
1
 EDP would not be useful on 
those occasions. But there is a very similar principle that 
would be applicable:
Comp2 EDP: if I become justified in believing that my be-
lief that p wasn’t formed competently, then I lack reflective 
knowledge, knowledge full well, and justified belief that p.
If I am justified in believing that my belief that p wasn’t 
formed properly, then I do not aptly believe that p was 
formed aptly, and so I lack reflective knowledge and knowl-
edge full well. I will also lack justification for reasons similar 
to those given regarding Comp
1
 EDP. However, I might still 
have animal knowledge—for I might have a justified false be-
lief that my belief that p was formed incompetently. But this 
will be cold comfort because Sosa argues (as noted above) that 
our beliefs should align with our reflective-level assessment 
when we have such an assessment. So, when the antecedent of 
Comp
2
 EDP is satisfied, I might still have animal knowledge 
that p, but I nevertheless shouldn’t rationally continue to be-
lieve p. I should su end judgment even if I might well be able 
to animally know that p.
Our next question is this: do CSR theories, assuming 
belief in them is well-justified, give us good reason to think 
that religious beliefs are formed incompetently? To answer 
this question, we first need to chara erize the religious be-
lief-forming process, as theorized in CSR. Then we will 
need to examine whether that process constitutes a skill and 
whether we are in the right shape and situation for the skill to 
operate reliably.
CSR theorists have developed several different theories 
of why humans have religious beliefs. Byproduct theories 
hold that religious beliefs commonly result as a non-selected 
byproduct of the operation of cognitive processes that have 
been selected-for (Barrett, 2004; Boyer, 2001). Adaptive the-
ories hold that religious beliefs are individually or collectively 
adaptive and so have been culturally selected-for (Wilson, 
2002; Bering, 2011). And then there are exaptation theories 
which hold that religious belief entered the human scene as 
a byproduct, but was later selected-for (Norenzayan, 2013; 
Bulbulia, 2007). I’m not going to argue for one of these views. 
Fortunately, I don’t need to; the philosophical points I make 
will apply mutatis mutandis to whichever theory you like. 
So, I’m just going to pick the exaptationist theory, in part 
because it combines the explanatory hypotheses of the oth-
er two kinds of theories. It is thus particularly useful for my 
purposes because it enables me to, in a way, be most generous 
to CSR—allowing the debunker to assume a robust, richly de-
veloped, multifarious explanation of religious belief. 
Here then, to briefly and brutally summarize a lot of 
interesting work, is the theory we shall accept of why hu-
mans have religious beliefs. Humans have a variety of cogni-
tive mechanisms that incline them towards belief in invisi-
ble agents: a highly sensitive agency detection module that 
is prone to fire at the slightest indication of agency (Barrett, 
2004); a preference for spreading and considering minimally 
counterintuitive concepts—which include concepts of in-
visible, nonphysical agents (Boyer, 2001); a mechanism for 
attributing and  eculating about the mental states of oth-
ers that operates independently of mechanisms for thinking 
about the behavior of bodies—and this mechanism tends 
early in life to attribute a lot of knowledge to agents (Bering, 
2011; Barrett, 2012); and an inclination toward teleological 
reasoning about the features of the physical world (Kelemen, 
1999, 2003, 2004). All of these mechanisms make it so that 
we can very easily think about invisible agents, their minds, 
and their desires, and we are prone to talk about them and to 
consider them as explanations for various events and a ects 
of the physical world. Certain of these concepts are social-
ly adaptive—namely concepts of powerful, knowledgeable, 
nonphysical agents who care about what we do. If we believe 
in these beings—gods, we’ll call them—we will feel watched, 
which will encourage pro-social behavior and discourage 
free-riding. This is generally adaptive. But then, in addition, 
we will begin to provide signals of being particularly devot-
ed to the gods so that we can find and cooperate with those 
people who are most likely to cooperate with us, thus further 
benefiting us. A community that has a decent number of peo-
ple who believe in such gods will thus thrive, and the belief in 
these gods will spread (Norenzayan, 2013).
Given this theory, how should we chara erize the hu-
man religious belief-forming process? Notice that this theo-
ry is a theory of why religious beliefs, particularly beliefs in 
invisible agents like gods and ance or spirits, are widespread 
in humanity. But it doesn’t propose to explain why any par-
ticular human holds religious beliefs. We shall draw further 
attention to this point later. But given the explanation appeals 
to what are proposed as roughly universal human chara er-
istics and situations, if the theory is true, then probably many 
if not most humans’ religious beliefs are influenced by the 
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various factors the theory mentions. This process appears to 
work as follows: it takes as input (i) various experiences of the 
physical world that seem to involve agency where there isn’t a 
clear physical agent, and (ii) testimony about possible invisible 
agents and then, through the mechanisms described above, 
produces or maintains a belief in an invisible agent. The shape 
one must be in for the process is just whatever shape allows 
these mechanisms to function—so having normal use of your 
perceptual faculties, being alert, not suffering from various 
disabilities. The situation for the proper operation of this 
process would appear to be the situation in relation to which 
these mechanisms evolved: an environment with a wide range 
of agents and obstacles that make cooperation beneficial.
Does this process count as a skill—that is, is it a dispo-
sition to produce beliefs that are mostly true in the proper 
shape and situation? The process probably is reliable at pro-
ducing beliefs about agents in general—when and where 
there are agents in the environment and what those agents 
might intend and believe. But we’re intere ed in a more  e-
cific set of beliefs—beliefs about invisible agents. A process 
could produce reliable beliefs of type B, but also produce un-
reliable beliefs of type C (even if C is a subset of B). 
This process produces lots of different beliefs about in-
visible agents. Some people believe in ance or spirits, sprites, 
ghosts, others in gods of various sorts, and some in one su-
preme god. Almost surely not all of these things exist. But 
even if many of them exist, the process as described doesn’t 
track which ones exist; it’ll produce a belief involving what-
ever kind of invisible agent concept happens to be floating 
around one’s community (provided it is minimally counterin-
tuitive). So, it would be pretty easy for this process to arrive at 
a false belief, thus it appears not to be a skill.
But what if we consider the more general belief, “there is 
some sort of invisible agent”? Might the process produce be-
liefs like this that are mostly true? Well, it is hard to answer 
this question without some independent way to evaluate 
whether there are invisible agents and, by hypothesis, we’re 
imagining that the only way we have is the CSR belief-forming 
process. One might thus argue that when we move to the re-
flective level we can rely on a default entitlement to follow our 
basic belief-forming methods, which confirm themselves, and 
remain untroubled by this sort of circularity (as Sosa has long 
argued; see e ecially Sosa, 2009). Thus, at the reflective level 
we are not justified in thinking that religious beliefs are formed 
incompetently through the CSR process, and so we can’t em-
ploy Comp
2
 EDP in an argument to debunk religious beliefs.
In reply, one might note that the belief that there is 
some sort of invisible agent is presumably inferred from an-
other belief in some particular invisible agent. Since that lat-
ter belief is not reliably formed, any belief logically inferred 
from that can’t be any epistemically better than the epis-
temically flawed belief it is based upon. By way of rejoinder, 
however, one might suggest that perhaps the CSR mecha-
nism sometimes directly produces more general beliefs like, 
“some sort of invisible agent is at work here.” And if that is so, 
then we are brought right back to the argument of the pre-
vious paragraph. In addition, one might argue that if a god 
like the Judeo-Christian God exists, then he would probably 
intend for humans to form beliefs through this process that 
there are invisible agents. Thus, part of the situation of the 
process would include God’s existence and intention. But 
once again, by hypothesis, we don’t have any independent 
means of determining whether that situation obtains, and 
so we are again brought back to the argument of the previ-




Sosa’s epistemology gives us another debunking princi-
ple that may well be more successful, however. The principle 
goes as follows:
Apt EDP: if I become justified in believing that my belief that 
p wasn’t formed aptly because I might easily have formed it 
incompetently, then I lack reflective knowledge, knowledge 
full well, and justified belief that p.
Return to Sosa’s example of my belief that my car will 
start, arrived at while the mad bomber flips his coin. Let’s 
modify the example slightly: now I know about the mad 
bomber and his plan (but not how the coin flip comes out). 
In this modified example I have good reason to doubt wheth-
er my belief that my car will start is apt because I have reason 
to doubt that the background conditions of the situation will 
continue to hold. My belief might turn out to be competent 
and apt, and thus amount to animal knowledge (if the bomb-
er’s coin flip tells him not to detonate), but it might not and 
the risk of the latter is pretty high. So, at the reflective level, I 
can’t tell that my belief is apt, thus I lack reflective knowledge, 
knowledge full well, and justification (because there is a suf-
ficiently high chance of forming the belief incompetently).4
In short, once we rise to the reflective level we want 
good reason to think that we are going to employ a first-or-
der process that would likely enough be apt. If we lack such a 
reason, then (for the reasons given above) reflective knowl-
edge, knowledge full well, and justification are absent. Let 
me give one more example to illustrate this point. In the film 
Total Recall, Douglas Quaid purchases a “virtual vacation” to 
Mars through the Rekall company.5 The vacation is virtual 
because the company merely implants in the “vacationer” a 
bunch of false memories as if the vacationer had gone on 
vacation. However, while Quaid is hooked up to the ma-
chine that is about to deliver him false memories, he tries to 
escape—believing that he is a secret agent whose cover will 
be blown. He proceeds, without undergoing the false mem-
ory implantation—or so it seems—to go on an adventure 
4 Very similar reasoning shows that SafetyJ EDP is quite plausible as well.
5 The film is based on the Philip K. Dick story, “We Can Remember It for You Wholesale.”
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that takes him to Mars. At the end of the film he wonders 
whether all the experiences he has had on his adventure re-
ally happened, or whether they were themselves implanted 
vacation memories.
Take one of Quaid’s beliefs arrived at during his adven-
ture—“I have visited Mars.” This belief of Quaid’s is not one 
that he reflectively knows, full well knows, or justifiably be-
lieves. He has good reason to doubt that he formed it compe-
tently for he might well have had the procedure at the Rekall 
company and if he did, then his memory isn’t competent for 
this belief. But he might really have escaped the company 
before having the procedure (as he seems to remember), in 
which case his memory is competent and he could have an-
imal knowledge that he visited Mars. But from what he can 
tell there is a good chance of either. So, there is a good chance 
he formed the belief incompetently, thus unreliably in the cir-
cumstances. These grounds for doubting whether his memo-
ry is competent indicate that he rationally shouldn’t trust his 
memory, and so he should su end judgment (again even if 
he in fact didn’t have the procedure and thus is able to have 
animal knowledge).
This example of Randy Quaid is useful because we can 
give a parallel sort of argument regarding religious belief (on 
the assumption that the CSR process is what produces hu-
mans’ religious beliefs). We have some independent reason 
to doubt that God exists—the problem of evil, for instance. 
Now, I realize that my belief that God exists issues from the 
CSR process. I’m like Randy Quaid—if God exists, as the 
process itself tells me, then my process is competent (for the 
reasons given in my discussion of Comp
2
 EDP) and can easily 
be apt ( just as Quaid’s belief can be competent and apt if he 
really did escape the company and get to Mars, for his mem-
ory would then competently deliver him a true belief that he 
had escaped). But if God doesn’t exist, then the CSR process 
is incompetent (again, for the reasons given above). Given the 
independent reason to doubt God’s existence, it (epistemi-
cally) could turn out either way. I thus have good reason to 
doubt that the CSR process that issues in my belief in God 
is competent, so I shouldn’t trust it. Belief in God, as well as 
other religious beliefs issuing from the CSR process, are thus 
debunked. And this argument rests on Apt EDP.
This debunking argument relies on the claim that there 
is at least some good reason to doubt that God exists. But it 
also essentially relies on the description of the CSR process. 
Other sorts of belief-forming processes wouldn’t be debunked 
in this way—for instance reliance on some classic argument 
for God’s existence. The fact that we have reason to doubt that 
God exists doesn’t give us any reason to believe that we are 
incompetent at assessing arguments for God’s existence. So, if 
we had such arguments that we found plausible, they would 
count as good reason to believe and then would just need to 
be balanced off against the reason to doubt God’s existence in 
order to determine whether belief in God was justified.6
This brings me to the final move in my examination 
of the debunking argument. We’ve seen that Sosa’s episte-
mology, via Apt EDP, does ground a plausible debunking ar-
gument for religious belief on the assumption that religious 
belief is formed via the CSR process described earlier. But I 
don’t think that the CSR process completely captures most 
believers’ belief-forming process because most believers in a 
god have fairly  ecific beliefs about that god and those  e-
cific beliefs are supported by various arguments that believers 
typically find plausible—e.g. cosmological arguments, design 
arguments, arguments from miracles and religious experi-
ence, and the like and reliance on testimony from those who 
are familiar with these arguments. I’m not saying that every 
religious believer has carefully thought through these argu-
ments; and I don’t think one needs to do so to be reasonably 
persuaded by an argument. Often with arguments for God’s 
existence there is some phenomenon that is taken to be a sign 
of God’s existence. There are many ways of trying to argue 
from that sign to God’s existence—many bad ways, possibly 
some good ways. I think that as long as there are some good 
ways and the phenomenon really is a sign of God’s existence, 
it can be rational to believe on the basis of that phenomenon 
even if one hasn’t carefully thought through  ecific versions 
of theistic arguments.7 Many people who believe in God do 
believe at least in part on the basis of the phenomena that are 
taken to be signs of God’s existence. It is only in this sense that 
I say that most believers believe at least in part on the basis 
of arguments. And as I just argued in the previous paragraph, 
the debunking argument does not succeed in debunking our 
ability to evaluate these arguments. And so the rationality of 
believing in a god in this way—perhaps primed by the CSR 
process, but boosted by arguments—isn’t debunked.8
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